Corporate Governance in Jordan and Boardroom Diversity: A Critical Review of Literature by Mkheimer, Ibrahim Mohammad
European Scientific Journal April 2018 edition Vol.14, No.10 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431  
359 
Corporate Governance in Jordan and Boardroom 
Diversity: A Critical Review of Literature 
 
 
 
Ibrahim Mohammad Mkheimer 
 (PhD Candidate of Business Management) 
Faculty of Economics and Management Sciences,  
University Sultan Zainal Abidin, Terengganu, Malaysia 
 
Doi: 10.19044/esj.2018.v14n10p359  URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/esj.2018.v14n10p359 
 
Abstract 
This paper focuses on critically analyzing the present literature which 
discusses the Corporate Governance (CG) concept in Jordan and board 
diversity, and the potential benefits obtained from adopting this concept in 
different streams like its impact on the total organizational performance. The 
paper also aims to present related theories and empirical literature focused on 
the composition of corporates’ boardroom and the role of its diversity in 
achieving their objectives such as competitive advantage. It also aims to 
determine the gaps and guidance for future studies. The review shows 
examples of basic theories, definition, methodologies, and certain industries 
deficiencies in previous studies and literature which limits the generalizability 
of their findings in specific environment, industry, and population. Finally, the 
study also presents implications on implementation, theory, and the best 
practice of Corporate Governance. 
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Introduction  
 Corporate governance (CG) indicates the framework of large 
companies and the way these companies manage their businesses to achieve 
their strategic objectives, which focuses traditionally on maximizing 
shareholder’s wealth. CG basically means the board of directors who govern 
the whole organization; the executive levels that make essential decisions; and 
the lower levels of management under them that carries out these decisions in 
a way to achieve the organization’s interests. It is a fundamental matter in the 
society and can be a major objective for organizations at various levels 
(Shailer & Greg, 2004). The governance demonstrates the rules, principles, 
and also distribute the rights and duties among several parties in the 
organizations (for instance, the board of directors, executives managers, 
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shareholders, employees and other stakeholders) and forms the basics and 
processes in making decisions (OECD, 2004). CG as well includes the 
methods through which organization’s objectives are determined and strives 
in the light of social, legal, and economic environment. Governance notion in 
the same vein consists of controlling the activities, plans, and actions of 
organizations, their representatives, and influential stakeholders (Ricker, 
2009). 
 
Corporate Governance and Boardroom Diversity 
 There is no single definition of CG due to its several perspectives 
which it is interpreted from. Zingales (1998) defined CG as “allocation of 
ownership, capital structure, managerial incentive schemes, takeovers, board 
of directors, pressure from institutional investors, product market competition, 
labour market competition, and organisational structure which can all be 
thought of as institutions that affect the process through which quasi-rents are 
distributed  (p. 4)”. The term “CG” has not been common. Few experts in the 
field of management have paid attention to this concept which generally 
characterizes the approach through which the companies are managed 
(O'Regan & Oster, 2002). Moreover, this term seems to be used almost 
globally in guidance, organizing, and supervision. Garvey and Swan (1994) 
underlined that “governance determines how the firm’s top decision makers 
actually administer such contracts (p. 139)”. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
illustrate CG as “the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment” (p.737). Oman (2001) 
characterized CG as a technique that indicates all types of organizations, either 
public or private, which involves rules, laws, and the business activities which 
dominate the relationship amongst the top managers and stakeholders. Lee 
(2006) defined corporate governance as “the formal mechanisms of directing, 
supervision, and control put in place within a company in order to monitor the 
decisions and actions of its senior managers and ensure these are compatible 
and consistent with the specific interest of shareholders and the various other 
interests of stakeholders who contribute to the operations of the company” (p. 
67). This definition refers to the responsibility of managers towards all 
stakeholders regarding directing, monitoring, and achieving organizational 
missions and visions. Responsibility, in this context, indicates that those 
managers are expected to give orderly records of their decisions and works. 
 Consequently, board diversity can be considered as one of the most 
competitive advantage sources (Cox & Blake, 1991). Different studies have 
proved a positive relationship between diversity of board of directors and other 
dimensions like organizational performance (Barney, 1991); quality, board 
gender diversity and corporate dividend policy (Al-Rahahleh, 2017); cash 
conversion cycle (Al-Rahahleh, 2016); CG and compliance of public limited 
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organisations (Alsharari, 2015); and CG, ownership structure and bank 
performance in Jordan (Al-Amarneh, 2014). However, this is because the 
success of the organization is directly connected with the upper level of 
management. The demographics of board of directors (BOD) and the variety 
of its members was indicated as the composition of these boards in light of 
various dimensions like gender, age, and educational basis and experience 
(Erhardt et al., 2003). Due to rapid changes and increase in the numbers of 
female employees, gender diversity has become an important stream for all in 
the organization. Board gender diversity indicates the existence of women in 
company boards of directors or percentage of women representation in these 
boards (Julizaerma & Sori, 2012). Despite the increasing concern with 
corporate governance recently, most of these studies were conducted in 
developed countries and compared to studies in developing countries which 
were limited (Habbash, 2010). Empirical research describes the value of 
presence diversified directors in regards to gender, age, and nationality in high 
positions in the boards who are to be responsible for many corporate outcomes. 
The association among gender variety, and performance, for example, has 
been unsaturated and still needs further research. In addition, some studies 
have developed a positive and significant relationship between these factors 
(Julizaerma & Sori, 2012).  
 All organizations are pursuing to obtain qualified members who have 
particular traits and skills in top managerial positions, such as chief executive 
officer (CEO), in their boards which might help in fostering their productivity. 
Bhagat et al. (2010) emphasized the importance of giving more attention to 
the educational background for board members in the hiring process. This 
basically is attributed to the fact that other measurements, like capabilities, 
may be very costly and difficult to measure. Gottesman and Morey (2006) 
stated that educational competences may be an evidence of brilliance, where 
most intelligent CEOs attempt to be the best in their field in comparison to 
their peers. Additionally, it is also worthy to note that outstanding 
management competencies does not always reflect a good level of education 
for managers. Latent characteristics, like leadership and creativity skills, may 
add a significant value. It is often noted that rapid improvement and high 
performance companies are controlled via people who have not acquired 
higher education (Gottesman & Morey, 2006).  
 Bantel and Jackson (1989) proposed that highly competence of CEOs 
have an ability to manage information and adapt with key changes in the 
company. A number of researchers found that qualified managers with 
technical competences can grant company’s departments with great resources 
(Barker & Mueller, 2002). Similarly, Graham and Harvey (2002) opined that 
financial managers who hold Master of Business Administration (MBA) tends 
to be more effective in adopting modern plans and mechanisms while 
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designing new projects. In connection with the educational background of the 
CEOs and members of board, it is associated with the financial performance 
of the company. Moreover, it is highly notable that empirical studies highlight 
on the relationship among CEOs educational level and the performance of the 
company. The present empirical studies are based on the data collected from 
the USA, for example, Gottesman and Morey (2006) and Bhagat et al. (2010). 
These studies provided a poor clue that CEOs holding MBA or higher degree 
from a prestigious university is linked with outstanding performance. The 
high-level management of the organization is hired due to their superior 
capabilities. According to Bhagat et al. (2010), such capability includes 
observable advantages (educational backgrounds or job experiences) and 
unobservable ones (leadership or creativity thinking). They stated difficulty in 
measuring the unobservable characteristics. Also, the observable traits may 
play an essential role in raising the value of the firm. Hambrick and Mason 
(1984) also stated that observable characters are interpreted as valid evidence 
based on their ability and knowledge level, which can affect the decision-
making process and managerial tactics. According to the upper-management 
theory, a higher degree of education is closely related with high negotiation 
and critical thinking skills, open-mindedness, the capability to address 
information, and acceptance rationally to changes (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). 
 
Theoretical Review 
 The separation between management and ownership in the 
organization increased the value of corporate governance in the modern 
organizations. According to O’Sullivan (2000), corporate governance is an 
exercise to control the resources distribution in a certain corporate. It is a 
system that shows how these corporate are being guided and managed (OECD, 
1999). Rabi (2010) confirmed that a growing concern has been highlighted on 
observing and evaluating the CEOs and high-level managers by BODs as well 
as shareholders through corporate governance principles. 
 The theory of corporate governance roots from the thesis entitled “The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property” by Berle and Means (1932). The 
study focuses on major agency problem in contemporary companies where 
there was segregation amongst management and capital. It was known that 
modern corporates were suffering from this separation between ownership and 
management. These corporates were managed by experts in management who 
are responsible for protecting shareholders’ interests. The agency theory and 
the resource dependency theory are some of the theories that are connected to 
corporate governance. The resource dependency theory highlighted the 
function of BOD as a provider of the company, while the agency theory 
asserted on the BOD function as supervising and controlling the CEOs to 
ensure that the company’s resources are employed for activities like increasing 
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investments which may increase a company’s value (Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003). Corporate governance was utilized largely as a tool to regulate and 
direct the decisions of the management. This is due to the separation between 
ownership and management in the organization; also, it may result in 
decreasing managerial transparency. 
 The implementation of corporate governance in companies depends on 
the degree of theories regarding corporate governance development such as 
principal-agent and stakeholder theory. The Principal–Agent Theory is the 
backbone of corporate governance. It assumes that managers acts in a selfish 
manner and strives for their own interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This 
theory is helpful in supplying “a way to explain relations between 
organizational actors within corporations and external stakeholders” (Coule, 
2015). Principal–agent connections appear when investors give resources to 
corporates, the authorities give powers to corporate’s board of directors, and 
then the boards give power to the executives (Liu, 2012). Furthermore, 
Stakeholder Theory supported the ideology of CG. Specifically, it defended 
that corporations have to bolster the social responsibilities of all stakeholders, 
which are divided into internal and external parties, like local community, 
employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, and governmental departments. 
The conflict among these parties may arise due to contradiction, for example, 
the conflicts between donors’ wants and customers’requests (Rochester, 
1995). The issue of corporate governance should be stated, and the actions 
taken according to stakeholders’ wants should be involved in the governance 
structure which is inconsistent with stakeholder theory (Hu, 2012). Agency 
Theory, nevertheless, is imperfect in explaining how managers can treat 
indirect stakeholders’ interests like politicians and what society expects from 
their companies (Nwabueze & Mileski, 2008). With its concentration on 
organizing, control techniques and managerial rules, agency theory left a gap 
in connection among governance and organization values through stakeholder 
involvement (Young & Thyil, 2009). This theory emphasized a control 
method to CG (Gillan & Starks, 1998) based on the opinion of corporate 
governance as a system of regulations, rules, and principles that monitor 
processes in the organization. In addition, the theory defended a collaborative 
model. Stewardship theory has evolved as an alternative approach to agency 
theory, and have obtained greater advocacy (Tian & Lau, 2001). This, 
therefore, is because the stewardship theory is close to stakeholder-oriented 
approach, whereas the agency theory converges to maximize shareholder’s 
value. 
 Corporate governance encompassed the term of both governance 
structure and mechanisms (Ma, 2005). Governance structure allocated the 
rights and tasks between the parties, such as the board of directors, executives, 
shareholders, employees, financers, and other stakeholders in the organization 
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(OECD, 2004). Meanwhile, governance mechanism comprises of the rewards 
and compensations given to executives and employees to work hard and 
achieve organizational objectives as well as supervise and control the 
activities, plans, and decisions. The governance structure is essential if agency 
problems are permanent and businesses are deficient. Thus, these mechanisms 
include supervision and election of the shareholders as their agents (Hart, 
1995). Subsequently, corporate governance can be interpreted as a mix of solid 
structure and efficient mechanism (Li, 2000). Solid structure defined the 
principles of stakeholders and prevailing relationships (Liu, 2007), while 
efficient governance mechanism displayed how to choose the actions and 
models to support in carrying out these principles. 
 
Critical Review of Literature  
 A study aimed to examine the role of board combination such as 
gender, age, and nationality of directors based on the level of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) disclosures was carried out (Young & Thyil, 2009). The 
study used a content analysis technique (panel data) to examine the influence 
between study’s variables. The findings were limited only to the period of 
2007 to 2011 with several industries like financial and service sectors. The 
study revealed great evidence that boardroom diversity has an important role 
in defining the degree of CSR disclosure. The variables of board diversity 
consist of independent members, foreign board and woman directors, which 
showed a positive effect on CSR disclosure in Jordan (Young & Thyil, 2009). 
 A relationship between CG and other aspects was found in present 
literature, especially in board diversity and corporate performance (Fan, 
2012). Moreover, many studies are still yet to be handled appropriately. Some 
of this literature identified that diversity within board members has a great 
impact on corporate financial performance. Also, few reviews have been 
conducted to show if this also measures non financial performance (creativity, 
employees’ satisfaction, and customers’ loyalty). Consequently, the majority 
of the studies addressed board diversity widely conducted in the developed 
countries which are mainly different in terms of its structure and multi-
dimensional contexts from the developing countries. The results of the studies 
which have been carried out in developed countries may not be suitable and 
can’t be generalized abroad due to complicated and hugely different internal 
structure for these environments. In a paper that investigates corporate 
dividend policy and how they can be affected by the quality of corporate 
governance and board gender diversity, the sample was non-financial firms 
listed on Amman Stock Exchange in 2009-2015. Three control variables were 
used in the study (firm size, financial leverage, and return on assets (ROA)). 
The results revealed that corporate governance quality and board gender 
diversity have a significant impact on corporate dividend policy. The low 
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representation of women in the boardroom was also one of the study results 
(Al-Rahahleh, 2017). CG quality was also a variable in another study with its 
influence on cash conversion cycle using industrial firms listed on Amman 
Stock Exchange in 2009-2013. The paper used three control variables (Sales 
growth, Firm size, and Net profit). The findings revealed, after using Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) regression analysis, that corporate governance quality has 
a significant negative effect on cash conversion cycle; the study further gave 
an implication to industrial firms in Jordan for future studies (Al-Rahahleh, 
2017). 
 Furthermore, some of these studies are restricted based on some of the 
limitations in regards to data collection and analysis like case studies and 
secondary data of annual reports for firms. It was recommended that the 
studies should be carried out with several methods like survey and primary 
data to beautify the results and provide a strong comprehension on the 
association amongst CG, boardroom diversity, and other factors. Nevertheless, 
a lot of previous reviews are restricted to only to companies listed in the stock 
exchange in a particular sector, and exclude other components of the national 
economy which contains vital business organizations. Empirical reviews on 
the relationship between board diversity and corporate performance, for 
example, are debatable with previous researches which demonstrated 
paradoxical results. Prior evidence also showed mixed and inconsistent 
findings. 
 
Corporate Governance in Jordan  
 The idea of corporate governance involves all universal and local 
values and rules purposed for the useful and authentic management of an 
organization. Jordan has applied international codes of corporate governance 
by including some of these corporate governance codes. These codes involve 
a lot of guidance in the light of good implementation of CG internationally. 
The codes were connected to the OECD rules and principles of corporate 
governance and the directing releases by the Basel Committee to promote the 
corporate governance codes in national organizations. In general, the 
recommendations that were linked to these codes were largely supported by 
those adapted from OECD principles. 
 The code was divided into different roles and responsibilities which 
belong to the board of directors, committee responsibilities, disclosure, and 
rights of stakeholders (Shanikat & Abbadi, 2011). According to the Jordanian 
company’s law, corporates should be managed by either a general manager or 
board of directors. These boards should be elected by the shareholders and 
should take into consideration stakeholders’ interests, organization’s 
objectives, and sustainability. The upper management should have a minimum 
competencies and qualifications to run the company. The law states the size 
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of these boards not less than 3 members in order to reinforce their decisions. 
Also, the CEO is required to run the company with transparency and 
commitment, and promote ethical and responsible decisions. The board of 
directors should designate two committees: audit and remuneration 
committee. This committee is responsible for investigating particular matters 
and give advice to the board. The company should disclose voluntarily an 
evaluation of the company’s position in a timely manner. This should be done 
based on all the information that might have a significant effect on the 
decisions of its stakeholders. Also, the shareholders have voting rights based 
on the type and amount of shares they have. The company may provide its 
website or other means of communication to state the shareholders’ rights in 
voting in the general shareholders meeting (Alsharari, 2015; Al-Amarneh, 
2014). 
 Oman et al. (2004) debated that corporate governance in emerging 
economies has been lately paid much attention to because of the fragility of 
corporate governance systems in developing markets, which was a key reason 
for a group of economic collapses which has a significant impact on these 
markets. Developing economies tend to build improved financial systems 
involving central banks, local banks as well as stock exchanges. They have 
less developed systems of accounting, governance, organizing and other 
financial tools, and less dynamic markets with the most developed 
infrastructures. These disparities conduced major doubt and also improved the 
variegation possibilities for shareholders from every country in the world 
(Kearney, 2012). Tsamenyi et al. (2007) have debated that there were lots of 
challenges encountering developing countries, involving risk and ambiguity, 
political turmoil, weak legislative system, vast intervention of government in 
companies, and low concern of protection for shareholders. 
 In Jordan, the corporate governance has been classified into a group of 
segments: a legislative dimension and government surveillance, capital 
market, disclosure and accounting standards, transparency, dynamic 
controlling of the board of directors, and protection of properties and minority 
rights (Khoury, 2003). These classifications were demonstrated in some of the 
local laws like Company Law in 1997 and Securities Law in 2002. The 
Jordanian government, through the ministry of trade and industry, attempted 
to implement these principles through multiple laws and other regulations 
(World Bank, 2004). 
 Subsequently, the legislative side has played a significant role in 
spreading the rules of corporate governance in Jordan through a collection of 
laws which helps in implementing corporate governance. Also, we can 
summarize these laws: for example, the Company Law 1997, Securities Law 
1997, Banking Law 2000, Insurance Law 1999 and others (Al-Jazi, 2007). 
Therefore, these laws demand companies to comply with approved 
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international rules and standards. Jordan have now agreed and carried out the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (World Bank, 2004). 
Additionally, in the 1990s of the last century, the government started a 
comprehensive reform based on several dimensions to encourage the private 
sector to be more effective in economic growth and entice more investments 
through selling some of the valuable assets to this sector in order to manage it 
(Shanikat, 2007). 
 The monitoring of the board of directors is of vital importance in 
corporate governance due to its role in supervision, directing and evaluating 
the decisions made by the management, and how these decisions correspond 
with the main objectives and visions for these companies (Gillan, 2006). Some 
of the law of the articles states that the board of directors is responsible for 
preparing plans, policies, and guiding the company management. 
Shareholders that have a minimum of 15% capital have the right to audit the 
company’s financial records. If they found any corruption or mismanagement, 
they can sue the BOD and the top management (World Bank, 2004). In 
Amman Stock Exchange published in 2005 on the Code of Corporate 
Governance, this code has some chapters and they are divided into certain 
subjects that contains definitions of some concepts; an introduction of the 
BOD frame and duties; investors’ rights; general meeting for public 
commission; and financial disclosure guidelines. Moreover, the code is not 
really mandatory. 
 A number of codes and rules have a crucial role to play in enhancing 
corporate governance such as  Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) principles and Cadbury Report (1992) (Mallin, 2007). 
Many countries have adopted these principles and Cadbury Report by 
applying several codes to achieve good practices of corporate governance. 
These rules attempted to carry out Cadbury Report via providing assortments 
of recommendation like BOD and ownership structure. Jordan, as well, has 
agreed and implemented these codes by including them into its own corporate 
governance guideline in 2006. These standards involve a variety of reference 
that is consistent with the best implementations in the world (OECD, 2013). 
However, we can’t talk about corporate governance in Jordan without 
referring to the pivotal and central role of the Central Bank of Jordan, which 
can’t be neglected in developing and raising the awareness on the importance 
of corporate governance in financial and non-financial industries. The Central 
Bank of Jordan published a handbook in corporate governance in 2004. In 
addition, they also prepared the codes of corporate governance which assisted 
in achieving the world corporate governance activities inside the local 
commercial banks in Jordan. 
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Conclusion  
 The current paper reviewed the literature which examined the structure 
of boardroom and its impact on corporate as a whole. The paper also 
highlighted some pathway for future studies. Majority of empirical studies 
exclusively tested the influence of board diversity on firm’s financial 
performance. So, there was a need in the future to conduct a study that 
investigates the connection between the diversity of board and non-financial 
performance. In addition, most of the previous reviews have methodological 
defects like employing a cross-sectional method which are restricted in 
identifying the causal-effect relationship between boardroom diversity and 
corporate performance. Therefore, future studies should make use of 
longitudinal methods to handle this matter. Furthermore, a few attempts have 
been done in the developing countries on the linkage among board diversity; 
moreover, the performance of firm did not involve a sampling technique, but 
it largely makes use of case studies. Thus, there was a limitation in their 
findings in generalizing it to a wider population. Future studies may explore 
various studies on the importance of this diversity and its influence in several 
developing contexts. This review may contribute to the corporate governance 
stream by providing a comprehensive framework of boardroom diversity 
advantages. Thus, the benefits of the researchers carrying out future studies 
are aimed to improve corporate governance environment in national and 
international context. Finally, the model evolved in this study may be useful 
for academics purpose to repeat this review in various industries and 
methodologies or even samples. 
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